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48 THE PROCEDURE OF THE GORTYNIAN INSCRITTION. 
THE PROCEDURE OF THE GORTYNIAN INSCRIPTION 
I PROPOSE in the following article to inquire what can be determined con- 
cerning the procedure of the Gortynian Inscription. It is scarcely necessary 
to insist on the importance of the subject. This is the only document that we 
have that gives us an authentic record of the earlier stages of Greek law. 
The history of Greek law is little known ; knowledge of it is most valua,ble 
for the light that it throws on the social and political life of Greece, and 
especially because it supplies a most important element in the comparative 
study of law. The legal side of history can never be neglected with impun- 
ity. Even though the Greeks never became such accomplished lawyers as 
the Romans, their legal and political institutions were closely connected, 
and our ignorance of their laws often prevents us from understanding their 
politics. 
It is however for its relation to the laws of other nations that Greek 
law deserves chiefly to be studied. Our knowledge of the early legal antiqui- 
ties of European races is still very limited. For the Teutonic and Scandina- 
vian law we have a large quantity of evidence, some of it of the greatest 
value. To compare with this we have only the Slavonic and Celtic records. 
The former are not generally accessible; the political subjection and anarchy 
which has been the fate of nearly all Celtic races has prevented their law 
from having that practical importance which is necessary to its efficient 
development. Our knowledge of early Roman law is singularly scanty; the 
very great and unique dtevelopment which-to a great extent from political 
reasons-it received in later times did away with most that was primitive in 
it. In Greece alone of all European races the highest political and literary 
achievements came at a time when the introduction of writing was so recent 
that law had not had time completely to supersede primitive custom. 
Greek cities in their highest prosperity still retained many of the usages 
peculiar to the tribal communities from which they had grown. An exami- 
nation of Greek law, as it was even in the fifth and fourth centuries, may 
therefore, if properly interpreted, give many interesting points of comparison 
and contrast with the earliest records of German law. 
There is another reason why Greek law is of peculiar value. It alone is 
certainly a purely indigenous growth. Even in the earliest records of the 
Teutonic races it is difficult to eliminate entirely the influence of Christianity. 
The very fact that the German records are chiefly in Latin betrays some 
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THE PROCEDURE OF THE GORTYNIAN INSCRIPTION. 49 
amount of influence from Roman civilization. Roman law-at least in the 
period at which our contemporary authorities begin--shows largely the 
influence of Greek thought and philosophy. In Greece alone no external 
influence is possible. Cretan, Spartan or Athenian law must have been the 
natural development from autochthonous custom. 
Our chief difficulty in investigating the subject has been the want oI 
technical evidence. This we have for the first time in the Gortynian inscrip- 
tion: there is every reason to believe that in the course of time similar 
inscriptions will be discovered in Crete or elsewhere. The evidence how- 
ever is often very difficult to interpret. It is impossible to use the code for 
comparative purposes till its meaning has been established. I propose in 
this paper to confine myself to the elucidation of one point, that of procedure. 
Much in it must remain doubtful, and even incomprehensible; some points 
of considerable interest can however, I think, be established. I have occa- 
sionally added a few illustrations from other laws which seem to corroborate 
my interpretations.1 
Throughout the code all cases are tried before a single judge, or S&xaar- 
rTj.: there is no trace of any trial before a jury for civil causes. It appears 
moreover as if the whole of a suit was tried before the same 
&txao'rs. 
The 
code itself however contains a very important distinction as to the duties of 
this judge. In some cases he is required &Kd~ELv, and in some o'JvIvTa 
KpiveMv. With the exception of one doubtfill passage,2 the distinction is always 
maintained: when he 'gives judgment' (&Ka'?t)l he does not take an oath; 
when he 'decides' (cpivet) he always does. The distinction is not accidental: 
one passage contains an express reference to it and explains when each 
procedure is to be adopted.' Our first step then must be to ascertain the 
meaning of this distinction. 
1 The editions of the Inscription and comlnents 
on it to which I have had access are : FABRICIUS 
(Mittheilungen des deutschen Archaeologischen 
Instituts zu Athen, Bd. ix.).-This contains a 
drawing of the inscription, with an edition 
founded partly on his own collation and partly 
on that of Halbherr. COMPARETTI (MuCeo 
ftaliaio di J itichilt (Ulassica, Vol. i.).-This 
also contains a copy of the original writing, 
with an edition in modern character as well as 
a translation and notes. This too is founded on 
the collation of Halbherr and Fabricius. These 
are the two authorities for the text: all other 
editions depend on them. BitCHELER and 
ZITTELMANN in the Rheinisches MuCseuim, 40ter 
Band, 1885, Erganzungsheft, give an edition 
of the text with translation, notes on the 
language, and full legal commentary. This 
is the only edition which deals fully with the 
legal matter of the whole. It is supplemented 
by an article by the same writers on the two 
H.S.-VOL. XIII. 
smaller fiagmnents in the Rheinisches Museum 
for 1886. LEWY (Berlin, 1885) has published 
an edition of the text with translation and 
short notes. BAUNACK (Johannes and Theodor), 
Leipzig, 1885.-A text and translation, with 
elaborate notes on the dialect. JACOB SIMON 
(Vienna, 1886).-An edition of the first half, 
with translation and a valuable legal commen- 
tary. There is a translation into English by 
RosY in the Law Qcarterly, Vol. ii., and into 
French by DARESTE in the Bulletin de Cor?'c- 
spondance Hellinique, Vol. ix.; and an article 
with useful suggestions on legal points by 
BERNHiFT in the Zeitschrift fiir vergleichende 
Rlechtswissenschaft, Vol. vi. In transcription I 
have followed the spelling of the stone. I have 
however used the letters -q and w, neither of 
which occurs in the original. 
" 
ix. 37. 
3 xi. 26. 
E 
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50 THE PROCEDURE OF THE GORTYNIAN INSCRIPTION. 
Zittelmann, who has discussed the point, leaves it unsettled.4 He 
states moreover in his discussion that 'there is no trace visible of a division 
of the procedure in jure and in judicio like that known in Attic and Roman 
law.' I hope to be able to show that the distinction between the two 
functions of the judge answers exactly to the distinction between the pro- 
ceedings before the praetor and judex in Roman law, and to the distinction 
between uvda'pto-tq and ipiot- at Athens. The peculiarity of the Cretan is 
that both parts of the trial take place before the same person. This fact 
however makes the maintenance of the distinction in procedure all the more 
remarkable. It will also throw much light on many obscure points in the 
Attic and Roman law. 
The proceedings at the adv6 pto-tq at Athens or in jlre at Rome had the 
object, not as a rule of finally deciding the case, but of determining what exactly 
the object of dispute was. The magistrate before whom they took place had to 
see that all the formalities required by law or custom were complied with; 
the accuser or plaintiff had to state his case, to produce the documents or other 
form-al evidence on which it was founded, and if the defendant was not 
present to show that with the proper formalities he had been summoned to 
appear. If the formalities were not complete the case was not proceeded 
with; if the defendant did not appear, although he had been summoned, or if 
he did not in the manner and woith the formalities prescribed by the law deny 
the charge or claim made by the claimant, judgment was given for the 
claimant. Only if both sides had properly performed all that was required 
did the suit pass out of this stage; if however a point of law or fact remained to be decided for which the law provided no purely formal criterion, and which 
therefore required a consideration of the merits of the case and the evidence, 
then the adpxwv or the praetor referred it to the decision of a St&acrTnptov or 
a judex: before him the parties had to plead their cause, and prove it by 
argument or by evidence. The important point to notice is that in the first stage 
the magistrate is bound strictly by the letter of the law: the law orders that 
a man trying to recover a debt shall begin by doing certain actions and bring- 
ing his claims in a certain manner; if he does so, judgment follows for him 
as a matter of course, unless his opponent performs certain acts and with his 
friends says certain words; if both do as required, then the judge can do no 
more, he has to hand over the case thus defined to another court. 
This distinction exactly answers to the distinction between the two 
functions of the trcao-rj; at Gortyn. 
This is referred to in the following words:- 
xi. 26.--'rb, StKao7rdr,, 6'rt pz, ICa7r /tat~rpavq ypr, raT7-at &LKaVr 
, 
7r;w'4oC07oov, &c•&e1, 
a~ 
7/par'at, rh, 
6' dXXeov 
• 
'vyra 
Icplvet, 
•TOpi 
rc 
F0oXLo.Eva. 
P I?C. p. 68, &c. 
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THE PROCEDURE OF THE GORTYNIAN INSCRIPTION. 51 
The judge, in whatever it has been written that he shall give 
iudgment according to witnesses or oaths, shall give judgment 
as has been written, but in other matters he shall take an oath 
and decide according to the contentions. 
The differences are thus that:- 
A.-He &/Kd~aL in those cases only where the law specially enjoins it; 
lie is then bound to give judgment in accordance with the law, and in the 
iudgment he is always bound either by witnesses or oaths. 
B.-In all other cases where the law does not order him S•Edca?tv he 
decides himself. When he acts in this way, he himself takes an oath and 
decides on the contentions apparently freely, without being bound by law, 
witnesses or the oaths. 
Now here the important words are /ca'' iPatr(pavn q•raCo'rov. 
We 
must first establish their meaning. 
1. Witnesses (Iairavp~e). 
It is this expression which has caused the difficulty in understanding the 
procedure. It has been assumed that the witnesses here referred to include 
witnesses whose evidence concerns the final matter of dispute between the 
parties. If this was the case it is clear that the real trial would take place 
before the &S/caCa74, and so we should not have the distinction between 
cplcv; and avdacpto-v. The passages however in the law where witnesses 
are mentioned show that this is not the case. The pairupe4 are not witnesses 
to any fact; they are formal witnesses to the proper performance of 
processual acts. Before a man can bring a case into court he has to go 
through certain formalities, these must be performed before witnesses, the 
presence of the witnesses is necessary to the validity of the acts, and their 
statement is the proof required by the law that the acts have been performed. 
This proof has to be laid before the &xaa-Tcrr or else the trial cannot proceed. 
Witnesses are also used to prove contracts, gifts, or transference of pro- 
perty; any actions of this kind to be finally valid must be performed before 
witnesses specially summoned for the purpose: if a lawsuit arises 
concerning this contract, their evidence on oath is final proof that the con- 
tract or transference did actually take place. If e.g. a man has made an 
engagement before witnesses to pay a sum of money at a certain date, and 
does not do so, his creditor when he brings the matter into court produces 
his witnesses who swear to and thereby prove the engagement. This is final 
on this point, the debtor (except and only by a separate action for perjury 
against the witnesses) cannot dispute the promise to pay: unless then he has 
some other defence, e.g. that he has already paid, the suit is at an end; it 
must be decided by the judge 
acara patrdipavc. If he has paid, the payment to be valid must have taken place before witnesses. If the contract has not 
been made before witnesses and is denied, then the case cannot be settled 
so easily, and will have to be tried in some other way. 
E2 
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52 THE PROCEDURE OF THE GORTYNIAN INSCRIPTION. 
I will now deal with the passages in order to show that this interpre- 
tation is correct: 
(I.) 
i. 38.-ai 8 eKa vaey • ^Xo*0, 4 ica vtcaO6, caXiv tava 
' pa'&Cpwv 
SuvCO 8popov Xeuv0pCv araoc86KtcccTar e r' 7T3 va^ 7"ri" ^ca vae i, 
Iq avi-o q 7Xoc a rp TrVO" a' 8E ca uI caXI ? ) eibolmp, 
KaTtCro-TaT Ta ypaiva. 
If the slave with regard to whom he has been defeated takes 
sanctuary, summoning him before two witnesses, runners, free- 
men, let him show him at the temple where he is in sanctuary, 
himself or another for him; but if he does not summon him or 
does not show him, let him pay what has been written. 
If a man A has had in his possession a slave who is judged by the 
court to belong to B, an order for restitution is made; if this is not obeyed A 
incurs certain penalties. Suppose however that the slave has fled to a 
temple so that A cannot restore him. A must then go to B accompanied by 
two witnesses and point out where the slave is; if he does so, even though B 
never recovers the slave, A has to pay only the price of the slave without any 
penalty. If B sued for the penalties, the plea of A that he had gone to 
asylum supported by the evidence of the witnesses that notification had been 
given would be an absolute bar to all further proceedings. The judge must 
decide according to the witnesses, and the case would never proceed beyond 
the first stage. 
(II.) 
Fr. B. 5.-ai 84 a rcrvadlcy ,7 p7 vvva-ovy d 
e8t00aa, KaXglv 
vr' 
parvcpcov &v e'v aT9 v7reVe, at ,Selloe, O , opKo/repov 
lf•427v aVrTov cKa~ vTe paprvpavg, at e7rE&E'o 
? 
erTXevYe 
) 
•Ev' aX7 
Fr. A. 6.-al Se ca ' E8rt17& aTo 7r apwOiev 77 w74 E reXeay T 
T7eTvalom g 77 /.4C7\? 'K,7, all oyparrac, /L - V&7 Ov IWypV. 
If it dies or he is not able to pursue it he shall summon him before 
two witnesses within five days to show where it is, he and the 
witnesses shall be on their oath,5 as to whether he pursued it or 
brought it to him or summoned him to show it. 
But if he does not pursue before, or does not bring the dead animal to 
him or does not show it to him as has been written, there shall 
be no case. 
S6pp•Lrepov: 
for the meaning of this cf. infra. p. 64. 
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A has lost cattle owing to the action of animals belonging to B; if he 
wants to recover in a court he must perform certain actions. He must first of 
all look for the strayed cattle: if the animal is dead he must take it, to B 
and lay it before him claiming restitution; if he cannot find it he must go to 
B and ask where it is. All these acts must be performed before witnesses. 
Unless by witnesses he can prove that he has performed them, he has no case 
(p~i 'VSKov tiprv); and his suit falls to the ground at once. If he has done so 
then there will be a prima facie case against B, and judgment will be given 
for A unless B has some defence. If B pleaded e.g. that the animal which 
did the damage was not his, then the case would proceed to the next stage; 
otherwise it is decided at once KaT paatvpavq. 
(III.) 
iii. 44.--al reKO'L Uyva K6peVOva, e7TeXE1'aLT 
7,a) 
dvsp Strt arTav 
dvor /LatrVpwv rpTIv. a' o , SEr&KatTo, e8'6 r 7Lapl /.ev TO 
T•rCVOV 
2 rTpa7revv ) aro6E/EV, OPtKLWT7pW', 
T ' E8EV 
' 
O KCESC-aTaV'm 
Kat rW' patrvpav, a 17rrlXevoav. 
at' e FotLKa 'rIEOL Iepe6ovo-a 
7reXe•ioat 
^ 
7a 
raaTaT r•o a'opoq o' COWVLE, av'rT/.Lat'TVp)V 8OUcV. 
iv. 6.--'opxcw'repov 
8' /PEV Trv erXredcav raa cKatl 7W patrpavc. yvva 
Krepevov'al dwroBjaXot 7ratlov 7rptv d7reXeO'at Kara Tra ypapp•va, 
X ev6Epo / Iay, CaTaaracet 7eVTr)KOVTa o-Trarpavq, pXai) ire•T•e 
Ka\t FitKa , at Ka vItaO^i. 
If a woman gives birth to a child when separated from her husband 
(by divorce or death), she shall cause the child to be brought to 
her husband to his house before three witnesses. If he does not 
receive it, the child shall belong to the mother, to rear it or to put 
it away, and the relatives and the witnesses shall be on their 
oath, whether they brought it to him. But if a slave-woman 
bears a child when separated from her husband, she shall cause 
it to be brought to the master of the man who is the father before 
two witnesses,.... and he who brought it and the witnesses 
shall be on their oath. If a woman who is separated puts aside 
a child before causing it to be brought according as it is written, 
in the case of a free child she shall pay 50 staters, in the case of 
a slave 25, if she is defeated. 
Here, again, the witnesses are witnesses to a formal action, called before- 
hand for the express purpose of being witnesses. If the father brings an, 
action, or the master of the father, to get damages for the exposure of a 
child, and the defendants can prove by the required number of witnesses that 
the father had an opportunity of claiming it, then the StEao-vr/ will at once give judgment ica?h rob1 1dp?rvpav: there will be no case to have a regular 
trial about. 
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54 THE PROCEDURE OF THE GORTYNIAN INSCRIPTION. 
(IV.) 
ii. 28 etc.-The case is that of a man being caught in the act of adultery 
in the house of the father, brother, or husband of a woman. The master of 
the house may seize him, when he has done so- 
rpoFet7rero e a & t I/patrupewo 7'ptev cro T tCKa~eo-Trat^ 7ro devatXCeevTroS 
diXXve'9at 6v Taiq '7Te/v T E'pacIA , r8 6 Xa co 7" Tat 
ptat"ripov s65v. al 
t eKa p aXX•ro-•Tat, ~-t' Troq 6Xoi't 
V eV 
p00aeo 
dra^ Ka Xelevrt. 
Let him give information before three witnesses to the relations of him 
who has been taken, that they may ransom him within five days, 
in the case of a slave, to his master before two witnesses. If he 
is not ransomed, he shall belong to the captors to do with him 
what they will. 
Here just in the same way the law requires him to act according to 
certain formalities; the formalities must be performed before witnesses, if 
they are not then they are not valid. In this case the proper performance of 
the formalities helps to protect the captor against a charge of false imprison- 
ment or violence. If he, after waiting five days, then killed the adulterer 
and was afterwards accused of murder, the evidence of the witnesses would 
protect him from the lawful revenge of the relatives. 
So far we have had to do purely with preliminary acts necessary to legiti- 
mate the process. In some cases the witnesses have to be present to prove 
the proper performance of an act which has to be performed in execution of 
the order of the court after the trial. 
(V.) 
xi. 46.--yvvh avSbphs & i Ka CpiKngrat, o &'Eaa'o-Ta 'pov ait 
a &taecEay] , 
v ra F ia-rt a i4pate " a troloaro 7 raptOdvTo ~r O StcKa7r. &oTt 
Ic' E7TtICaXf, 7rpoFetrdrTo TOb 73rdpcov Ta'dS'xa 7T ryvvatct cait 7rc 
S&icar T Kaal 7T( 1watdpovt 'rpo'reap'rov Pvi 4[alTvpav]. 
If a woman is separated from her husband, supposing the judge has 
given judgment that she shall take an oath, let her take the oath 
within twenty days in the presence of the judge. Whatever 
charge he brings against her, let him proclaim the matter of the 
suit to the woman and to the judge and to the mnemon four days 
before, before witnesses. 
This refers to an oath of purgation (cf. infra, p. 65). 
The accuser has here to bring witnesses when he formally reads the charge 
of which the woman has to clear herself, in order that the record of the oath 
may be clear and undoubted. 
This content downloaded from 134.184.26.108 on Tue, 27 Oct 2015 10:50:11 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE PROCEDURE OF THE GORTYNIAN INSCRIPTION. 55 
Besides processual acts, witnesses are also called to prove contracts or 
agreements; in this case also however they are not chance witnesses, they 
are men who have been present at the transactions to which they give 
evidence, having been summoned for the express purpose of giving evidence 
to it. Their evidence is necessary to its complete validity: e.g. when an 
inheritance is divided between the heirs, it is expressly enjoined that witnesses 
(pai'Tvpe9) should be present. 
(VI.) 
v. 
51.--•a'toIL'vot 
& Scpipa'ra Fatv~pave 7rappev Spop'ave 'XevOe- 
povK TpilV ' ArXtava. 
When they divide the property witnesses shall be present, runners 
freemen, three or more. 
The evidences of three witnesses in a court would be final and absolute 
proof that the division had been made, and would give a title for the posses- 
sion of any property the ownership of which was disputed. 
(VII.) 
We have also a case which deals with the process for recovery of a 
debt- 
ix. 43.--a't riK xa r~epat -vvaXXadKo-aVrt  dE rrpac efrtOelvrt ? ta7ro- 
Sts, at plv Ic)' 
7ro7raovtAVlto'rt 
.PFai'rvpeF ,f/lov'ev, •TO eKaTovOr•a- Trp( ACa\ • rXlovoT 7peiT, 7c 'eloovo 9L77' E 6TO SeKa(Trapov 
SVo, 7T~ 4Lelovo6' eva, 8ta88''• 7ropr Tl Ta7ro7rovtoLeveva ai 
 c 
F~aCI~UPE AfL~ cirrorrwvioev, 9) K' [rn]97 6qo- avvaX dlco-amv, OrepOV Ica 
EX?7TLat 0 
",evp7r0levo, 
?7 
arootot-at 
q o-vv- 
If any one made a promise for a date, or did not pay back to some one 
who had made a loan up till a certain date, if witnesses declare 
of full age, in a matter of 100 staters or more, three; of less down 
to 20 staters, two; of less, one; let him give judgment according 
to the statement of the witnesses; but if witnesses did not 
declare, or if he who made the promise ....... ., let him 
either take an oath or . . ., whichever the plaintiff chose. 
This is a very valuable case. If a man has made a promise to pay before 
witnesses and does not do so, the creditor has only to prove the promise by 
the witnesses, and judgment follows as a matter of course. There is really 
no trial, the judge only orders the execution of the agreement which has 
been made. If however the contract was not before witnesses, or if there is 
some further defence so that the evidence of the witnesses is not finald, 
another way of making a decision is necessary. 
6 Reading and meaning are doubtful. 
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56 THE PROCEDURE OF THE GORTYNIAN INSCRIPTION. 
(VIII.) 
One of the most important passages is unfortunately very obscure. 
ix. 24.--ai Jav8eoaLevo, q vevticaLpevo[0 . .] ~t6rav O7TeX)v ' Sta- 
3aX0Pevo ) •8taFet7rawpevoq 7r Odavot, TovT0 caXXoC, e'rtacoX^v 
7ri 7rpOTCO d'vavTr<j. 0& 
tM tcarTa; tca&Tm0 7ropTr Th caro7rcvteo- 
peva* al tpev xa viKa 7rtwG 
- 
, lCtKaoTaC? KI' ov pcoV ap c Ka 6a 
Kat nroXtaTev'ry ol  i Pairupe; o0l t'rt#LaX'ovlrV, av$oKC K"8ev 
coTloTav. xcat 8BaXoka^; KcaL &ppeaoo9 o airvpXe ol dwE'rl3kXovrTe 
daroircovovrMY. 4 O ' Kca wroFei'rovTrt •Kca80To oso-ravra a 
arov' ca TTon uatTUpav; vKsc7v To awrXoov. 
If any one who has become surety, or has been defeated in a suit, or 
is in debt (?), or claims to postpone payment, or has brought in a 
counter-plea, die; or if the creditor die; then the case must be 
brought afresh into court within a year. The judge shall give 
iudgment according to the statements (of the witnesses). In the 
case of a suit already decided the judge (who has decided it) and 
the recorder shall give evidence, if he is alive and in the city; 
in the case of a surety or a debt the witnesses whose duty it is 
(or the relations as witnesses); also if the defendant has claimed 
a postponement or has made a counter-plea, the witnesses whose 
duty it is (or the relations as witnesses) shall give evidence; but 
if they refuse the evidence the judge shall give judgment that 
the claimant and his witnesses shall support their statement on 
oath, and that he shall get the sum claimed (but that no 
additional fine be imposed).s 
7 Fab. •Adras h abdrv.. 
" It is impossible to discuss all the difficulties 
of this passage here : on some points however 
my translation requires justification. For 
bsdTrazs (or whatever the word really is) no 
satisfactory explanation has been given. 8ta- 
BaAdyevos and 8SaFeLrd•evos 
must refer to some 
action on the4 part of the debtor who makes 
some counter-plea to show why he need not 
pay. After his death the object of the court is 
to put the claimant in the same position with 
respect to the heirs of the debtor as he was to 
the debtor himself; in order to achieve this 
object each party has to bring forward proof for 
each stage in the proceedings which has already 
been reached. The claimant has (a) in the case 
of a suit already decided to prove this by the 
officials of the court; (b) in the case of a 
surety, or other form of debt to bring formal 
evidence of the contract. If the debtor, while 
alive, has entered no defence, judgment will 
then be given for the claimant: if the debtor 
has made a defence, then his heirs have to bring 
evidence that he has done so; this is expressed 
in the words 5taSoAaS ial &persos. This is 
evidence not as to the validity of the defence, 
but as to the fact that there was a defence. If 
this evidence breaks down (this seems the only 
possible meaning of &aroFeirwrE, cf. xi. 11) 
then judgment for the claimant follows as 
though the defence had not been set up. The 
law then adds two regulations: (a) that the 
claimant and his witnesses shall take an oath 
to the truth of their statement; (b) that not- 
withstanding the failure of an attempt to 
escape payment no fine shall be imposed, but 
only the simple debt paid. 
The peculiarity of this interpretation is that 
I take 
&roFeirwv•-t 
to refer only to the witnesses 
for the carsoAh and Btpects. This seems the 
only possible deduction from the fact that 
judgment for the claimant follows the refusal of 
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At least part of this is clear: if a man dies in debt, the creditor has to 
bring the matter before the court afresh (drrtLwoXet). If he can bring 
witnesses who have been called officially at the time to witness the debt, then 
judgment will be given for him. One special case is, supposing the 
matter has already been tried in court, then the officials of the court, the 
judge and the ' recorder' (juvapcov) are the witnesses. 
It is noticeable that the officials are chosen to be the witnesses of a 
judgment in court; in other communities we find that the people present in 
the court are solemnly called on to bear witness. 
(IX.) 
x. 25.-aiv'rpwrTov 
,) CjwipOat KicaarTaceit'evov, 7rplv 
K ' adVXXZWrat 9 
KaTraOev?, p•L' 
778ijappoXov, /Une 8EK-traOata 1pt' de'rrtoa7r•vTaat 
)qr 86 
•araOTaeCt" at tL~ "rrTOVTWV T•
Fepico-at, pq 6v dE 6?tpo 
e/v., al dorrowiotev )v o upairvpe6. 
It shall not be lawful to have sold to one a man who is deposited in 
trust until he who has deposited him have redeemed him (or v.1. 
have arranged), nor one about whom there is a lawsuit, nor 
receive him (as a present), nor have him promised or receive him 
as a pledge; if he do any of these things, then it is invalid, if two 
witnesses make a declaration. 
Here the declaration of the witnesses is clearly to the fact that the slave 
is in pledge, or that there is a lawsuit about him. The original owner has 
only to prove it by the witnesses present when the agreement was made, and 
the later transaction becomes null and void. 
In all these cases ptaitrvpe4 refers to witnesses of formalities. The form 
or act that they have to prove is sometimes proceedings in court, sometimes 
those parts of a process which are essential but take place out of court, some- 
times contracts or agreements. In all cases the witnesses are official, they 
must have been summoned beforehand for the purpose of witnessing the act; 
it does not include the evidence of accidental spectators. 
These passages are sufficient to show that this is the common meaning of 
the word; there remain two groups of passages where the meaning is at first 
less obvious. We may however use those which are certain to interpret 
the others. 
the witnesses to give evidence. The point of 
the words vruciv bb &wAdov is that it guards the 
heirs from the additional fine or double penalty 
which was generally imposed on those who 
sought to evade an obligation. Before the heirs 
are required to pay, the claimant must make 
formal proof in court of his claim. In xi. 31, 
&c., we have further regulations on the matter. 
The heirs may, if they like, instead of paying 
the debt, resign the whole inheritance to the 
debtor. 
If this is right we shall have for av6BoKda in 
v. 5 to read AYvOK&,d. Until a fresh examination 
of the stone is made it is however improbable 
that any satisfactory interpretation will be 
found. 
SBannack, &AAhovErat; Bii. apprb-; Fab, 
KaiTT1Y-. 
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(X.) 
i. 1, etc.--"g ' E'XevO'p'o 4 8~sX /k6XXy r, p rtFica, 7p a f a7ev. 
at 6 
•' 
aY?, a7tKaKoLa T&d 7T(^ E'Xev9Epo) S1a o-rcTaT?pav?, 7TC 
sd&X(o 7reY7e b'rt "Ayt, Kaia 
a KoaTo)- aya'aat 6 
E, Tatq' Tpta1 
a e-' 
patg. al [Se] xa a Xaryda'q, KaTa•tlKa84fto 7T6 t p6 dXev9epO) 
TrarT-pa, 'T OOX0o apxvav 
rci agppa T Feldcnrav s rplv xa XaEyda7. 
T7(O e KpOVo T7V •tgLKTalv o pLVUV`7a KplIVEV. ai avOT' 
•' 
I 
atyev, 7Tv 
StKaY 
a'b•vovvvTara Kptivev, 
at IL a7ro7rcviot' /aT'rvg. 
The question which the judge has to settle here is whether an illegal 
seizure of a slave has been made; one party asserts it, the other denies it. 
This being a question of fact which the law does not know, the judge has to 
decide on oath, unless a witness makes a declaration. The passage itself gives 
no clue to what the witness may be supposed to make a declaration about. It 
may be a witness for the defendant who came with him and proves that a 
legal and peaceful transference took place, and not a violent seizure. It may 
also be a witness that the slave had been adjudged to the defendant in a 
court, in which case he was allowed to seize him.10 It is possible that he is a 
witness of the plaintiff who was present, and who was called on (e'irt/iaprlpo- 
pat in Attic law) to bear witness to the assault. At present we have how- 
ever no other instance of this kind of uapr?vpia in this law. The fact that 
the judge must follow his evidence shows that he is formal evidence of the 
same kind as that in the other cases. 
If however the agreement has not been made before witnesses, then it 
{has to be proved in some other way. The witnesses are here too formal 
witnesses summoned beforehand for the express purpose of witnessing the 
agreement. 
1. 14, etc.-al 86 xia twX3 6 Ltv e'Xe6'epov, 6 8 S Xov, xapTdva' E'ev 
t.1. ex 'eV'epov a7rrorrvlwATr,. 
at K aic' avrrt 8XA LPoXtOvtI 
7rtWoV7Te F6v Fe6drepo ge'pev, atl /I) A a paIntru dTroTrowvy, KaTa 
7 airv Tvpa uci&Kaev* al 8 iK' Avo'7Idepote ' a7oro7rwOt&Wir) /1 
pLqTe7a7pcp, 7V& 8tKaoTa\v 0o/VVu7Ua KptIVeV. 
This, as Zittelmann points out, is a 'contravindicatio.' Each party 
maintains a positive plea: each says that the slave is his: he does not 
simply say 'the slave is not yours' but 'the slave is mine.' The ptaL'vpe6 
are witnesses to some formal action or agreement on which the possession is 
grounded, e.g. if the slave had gone to one of the parties on the division of 
his father's property the pai'rvpe6 who were present would give their 
evidence; unless the other party can produce a title at least as good, there 
is no cause to go on with the case. 
10 i. 
55.--•r 
5' vertcag~ie' tal Tbr iKraKlceror t/e yoOrL i raTor Pe'r. 
11 C. and Bit. 
T'r'rot. 
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If however he brings witnesses to assert that they were present as 
formal witnesses when the slave was transferred to him legally by a sale or 
as a present, then as both sides have a title the judge must decide which is 
the best. This may be a very simple matter: it may be merely a question 
of date, but for such matters witnesses are not used, the judge has to decide 
on oath. This passage, interpreted by the others, shows certainly the nature 
of 
,paiTvpe9 and the way in which they were used. 
Only one passage remains; it is one which has been frequently mis- 
understood. 
(XI.) 
ii. 16.--at Ka Tav 'XevO Epav E7rt7rr6lTat otlrl eov12 
oV aSCa, 
8 
r'a 
O-rarTpave KaraoTaa -ete , at arorowviot opatTvu. 
If he seduces a freewoman, who is in the charge of a relation, he 
shall pay ten staters, if a witness declares. 
It is not quite clear whether the passage refers to seduction or to secret 
marriage. The peculiarity of the case is that the woman is in the keeping 
of a cKaSeo-7r, i.e. obviously not of a father, brother or mother. The 
punishment is a fine to be paid to the KaSeo-rfg. The Kcaseo-7•j then in 
order to recover damages for the loss of chastity has to prove his right to sue. 
The witness is not a witness to prove the injury: no witness has been 
required in the preceding cases. We must suppose that the charge of the 
woman has been formally assigned to the relation before witnesses; otherwise 
he has none of the legal rights and privileges of guardianship. Cf. ix. 50. 
I think then it may be considered proved that in this code the word 
aaiT-vpep 
refers to formal witnesses of processual or contractual acts : there is 
no single case where it refers certainly to evidence which is brought to settle 
disputed points of fact. 
In other early systems of law this seems to be the common and regular 
meaning of the word. What we call evidence, the attempt to get at the 
truth of an event by the sworn statement of any one who may have any 
accidental knowledge bearing on the event, is of late growth. It was of 
course not unknown, but it was unregulated and not much confidence was 
attached to it. In the early German codes we can distinguish between 
'testes' or zeugen, and 'probatio.' In the earliest codes the word testis is 
nearly always, if not universally, applied to formal witnesses to processual acts 
or contracts. It is also used of the evidence of neighbours or members of 
the community to matters of common notoriety, such as the ownership of 
land. The two uses are closely akin: the title to freedom or property 
depended on the record of the community to which all belonged, and all 
members of it, especially the oldest, were always liable to be summoned as 
testes or zeugen of this: it. was so to speak one of their public duties. On 
12 C. i ivtfraio 4pevacKEVOYTos. 
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the other hand, in cases of murder or robbery and generally speaking of facts, 
in the early codes testes are never summoned to prove: they are only used 
to prove the mannitio and other similar acts. According to the earliest 
German law, if a question of fact remained to be decided witnesses were not 
used: the regular procedure was by ordeal, trial by combat or the purgatory 
oath. On the other hand, just as at Gortyn, witnesses are frequently used to 
prove formal acts, such as a summons or a sale, and the codes are full of 
reference to these witnesses. It is only necessary to quote a few passages to 
illustrate this. For the summons to court which occupies such an important 
place in Roman and Attic law, cf. Lex Sal. 1. 2. et ille qui alium mannit 
cum testibus ad domum illius ambulare debet. 
Ib. Ivii.-Ibi duodecim testes erunt qui per singulas vices tres jurati 
dicant, quod ibidem fuerunt ubi rachineburgii judicaverunt ut aut ad ineo 
ambularet aut fidem de conparibus faceret.•" 
For the case of a slave who has to be produced to answer a charge cf. 
Lex Rib. xxx. 11.-Quod si .... fuga lapsus fuerit, ad placitum veniens 
(dominus) cum tribus testibus in harario conjurat, quod servus illi, quem ad 
igneum representare debuerat, extra ejus voluntate fuga lapsus sit. 
The testes here prove not the flight of the slave, but the oath of the 
master. For witnesses to a sale cf. 
Lex Rib. lix.-Si quis alteri aliquid venderit et emptor testamentum 
vindicionis accipere voluerit, et in mallo hoc facere volverit, precium in 
praesente tradat, et rem accipiat, et testamentum publici conscribatu?r. 
Quod si parva res fuerit, septem testibus firmetur, si autem magna duodecim 
roboretur. 
Et si quis in posterum hoc refragare vel falsere voluerit, a testibus 
convincatur. 
Here there is a written document, but the procedure is obviously the 
same; the older procedure is shown in a passage that follows on this: 
lb. lx.-Si quis villamin aut vineam vel quamlibet possessiunculam ab 
alio comparaverit, et testamentum accipere non potuerit, si mediocres res est, 
cum 6 testibus, et si parva, cum tres, quod si magna, cum 12 ad lociul• tradicionis cum totidem numero pueros accedat, et sic eis praesentibus 
13 In the oldest of the codes, the Lex Salica, 
this distinction is preserved almost without ex- 
.ception. An apparent exception, ii. 13, is not 
a real one, for though testes are referred to in 
connection with the probatio, the point that 
they prove is ' quod votivus fuit,' i.e. a solemn 
act of consecration. Similar is xxxiii. 2: 'Si 
quis cervum domesticum signum habentem fura- 
verit ant oceiderit, qui ad venationem man- 
suetus est et hoc per testibus fuerit adprobatum 
quod eum dominus suus in venationem haun- 
isset.' The testes prove not the act of theft 
but the condition of the stag. 
xxxvi.-' Si quis homo ex quolibet quadru- 
pedem domesticum occisus fuerit et hoc per 
testibus fuerit adprobatum,' is a real exception. 
As is also ix. 8, 'si convinctus eum fuerit ad 
testibus.' At least one of the MSS. however 
adds in the first case the words 'Iquod non 
soluerit.' 
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pretium tradat et possessiones accipiat, et unicuique de parvolis alapes donet 
et torquet auriculas, ut ei in postmoduni testimonium praebeant. 
With the local variations we have here formal witnesses called to prove 
the title. Just however as in (VII.) ix. 51 if witnesses could not be got the 
matter was decided by oath, so the clause continues-- 
Si autem testes non potiterit admanire, ut ei testimonium praebeant, 
utu rein suam cum 3 sibi14 cum 7 cum sacramentis interpositione sibi studeat 
evindicare. 
If he cannot get witnesses to prove the original transfer he does not prove 
possession by witnesses but by oath with the oath of others. This oath of 
the ' eideshelfer' is of course in some ways evidence: but it is never spoken 
of as 'testes' 'zeugen ' and is quite different in its origin. 
In one of the Capitularies of Chlodovicus is a long paragraph giving 
regulations for discovering a murderer; in the Lex Salica, xliii., regulations 
for discovering who is guilty when a man was killed in 'contubernio' : in 
neither case is there any mention of 'testes.' The procedure is to find out 
the people against whom there is prima facie ground for suspicion and then 
make them clear themselves by an oath. Testes are not used to prove facts 
unless they have before the fact been deliberately summoned by one of the 
parties to witness his action. The best account of it is given by Brunner, who 
says: "The proof by witness (Zeugenbeweis) had in the old German law a 
much smaller application than in modern law. Accidental knowledge did 
not suffice to form the legal character of a witness. Had any one the most 
minute knowledge of the matter in dispute he could not appear as witness 
if he had not been at the time led by the parties to the action in question 
in order to give evidence if necessary.'5 Besides these witnesses in the strict 
sense, who i.e. are ' led' (gezogen) formally to confirm legal acts, and so may 
be called 'geschiftszeugen,' there were known only the ' gemeinde.zeugen' who 
gave testimony to conditions and actions which were notorious in the place 
or community, in their character as neighbours or members of the same 
country. The proof of judicial acts, which in later times meets us as a 
special form of evidence legally distinguished, was in the oldest period 
given, not as 'Dingzeugniss' by the judge and the Schoffen,'6 but simply 
by the party with the help of the ordinary proof." 17 
In the Anglo-Saxon laws the word witness is without exception used in 
a similar sense: it means those who were present at a contract or sale, in 
order to be witnesses of it, e.g. ' Let no man exchange any property without 
the witness of the reeve, or of the mass-priest, or of the land-lord, or of the 
" herderc " or of other un-lying men.' is 
14 Sc. 'sive' (as in Codex B). 
15 This passage is quoted from Beaumnanoir, 
xxxix. 57 : '1Nus tesmoins combien qu'il seust 
de le coze ne soloit rien valoir, s'il n'estoit ap- 
peles des parties ia le coze fere proprement per 
porter tesmonage de le coze qui feu fete de se 
mestiers estoit.' 
16 Contrast this with ix. 32. 
17 Brunner, Entstehung der Schwurgerichte. 
Cf. also Ib. Geschichtc des Deutscken Rechts, ii. 
392% &c. 
Is Aeth. i. 10. 
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'And let every man, with their witnesses, buy and sell every of the 
chattels that he may buy or sell, either in a " burh" or in a wapentake; and 
let every of them, when he is first chosen as witness, give the oath that he 
never, neither for love, nor for fear, will deny any of those things of which 
he was witness, nor declare any other thing in witness, save that alone which 
he saw or heard: and of such sworn men, let there be at every bargain two 
or three as witnesses. And he who rides in quest of any cattle, let him 
declare to his neighbours about what he rides, and when he come home, let 
him also declare with whose witness he bought the cattle.' 19 
'And let no one buy anything above the value of four pence, either 
living or lying, unless he have the true witness of four men, be it within a 
burh, be it in the country. For if it then be attached and he have no sure 
witness, let there be no vouching to warranty, but let his own be rendered 
to the proprietor.' 20 
It is a peculiarity of the old English law that the witnesses are an 
official body of men appointed once for all from whom all witnesses for each 
suit are to be taken. They have to prove not only legal actions to which 
they are witness, but generally ownership or title to property; they are the 
records of all transfer of property, their declaration is legal proof. In no 
case however do witnesses prove actions, such as robbery or murder; it is 
not till the Norman law has supplanted the English that the word witness is 
used in this sense. 
In Icelandic law a similar distinction is made. Witnesses (vatterd) are 
used and required in all ceremonial actions. On the other hand the truth 
of doubtful points of fact is determined by a sworn committee of enquiry 
(quipr) who occupy a position something between that of a jury and of 
witnesses. The word vatterd is restricted in its use just as is uai'rvT, zeugen, 
gewittness or testis. 
In Roman law there is abundant evidence that this was the original 
meaning of the word 'testis' and its derivatives. It is only necessary to 
refer to the words of the XII. Tables : 21 'Si in jus vocat, ito. Ni it, ante- 
stamino igitur eum capito.' The word testimonium and all the proceedings 
connected with the making of a will are simply an instance of the regular 
procedure with ' testes.' The Litis Contestatio is the calling on those present 
in court to bear witness to the proceedings. 
At Athens it is interesting to notice that the law of evidence never 
really progressed. As is well known in a SKcaa'rp 
ov there was no examina- 
tion of witnesses, all that could be done was to read out the paprvpiat 
that had been heard in the 
ahvd'cpt-crt. 
Of course these p'dpTVpe6 were in 
later times called with a view to the later proceedings before the Stea•'ral and were no longer confined to witnesses to formal acts, but the old rule was 
maintained that ap'rvpia4 belonged to the preliminary and formal proceedings. 
This is also shown by the rule which excluded slaves and women from giving 
19 Edgar, Supp. 6. 20 Cnut. 24. 21 Bruns. i. 1. 
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evidence. At Rome this custom was broken through at an early period; 
witnesses were freely heard and examined by the judex. 
It appears then that in all our earliest authorities we have no 
record of witnesses used as now of casual spectators who are required to give 
evidence which may throw light on the matter in dispute. On the other 
hand the old laws are full of regulations with regard to these formal witnesses. 
The distinction of the two kinds is that while according to modern notions 
the statement of a witness is something to be weighed, of which the 
credibility and importance has to be estimated, the statement of the formal 
witness is for the time absolute proof of the fact to which he has been 
witness. The procedure belongs of course chiefly to the period before the 
introduction of writing. It was soon superseded by written records and 
written contracts. When this was done the words for witness got a more 
extended use. It is therefore only in the oldest authorities, the English 
codes, the Lex Salica,2" the Scandinavian authorities and the Gortynian code 
that we can expect to find the word used with its one meaning alone; in 
them as a matter of fact and in them alone the words are used only in this 
technical sense. 
The fact then that when the Stcao-rT' SKc'?et he has to do so KaTa 
auaitrpavq, is not a reason for supposing that the real trial took place at 
this stage; paprvpia in its technical sense was as in other laws confined to 
the purely formal procedure, which is to be distinguished from the real 
settlement of a disputed point by bringing the minds of one or more men 
to weigh opposing evidence or pleas. The production of the papTrpiat was 
like the production of signed contracts or official records of a transaction in 
a modern court. The proof of a payment by /~ppTvpeq was like proof by 
producing a receipt to a bill. 
2. Oaths. 
The second characteristic in the preliminary procedure is that it 
may be a'rn-,orTov. In order to understand this it is necessary to 
draw attention to a distinction of great importance in the wording of the 
code, which has been ignored by Zittelmann. In the code we must distin- 
guish between two kinds of oaths. There is the oath by which the formal 
assertions of witnesses or of either of the parties to a suit are supported. 
We do not know whether witnesses and pleaders were always obliged to take 
an oath, probably the opponent could always require them to do so; this 
oath is referred to in the expression OpKtCrTepov. Quite distinct from this is 
the oath by which after the charge or plea has been formally established the 
accused clears himself; this is the purgatory oath so common in German 
law, and is closely akin to the o'prKo in the 7rpKcXfo-t9e el p o f Attic 
law.23 This is always referred to as arrbo~aat. When the pleas on both 
sides had been made, the usual course was for the judge to take an oath and 
22 For the Lex Salica see however Brunner, 
op. cit. ii. 394-5. This volume did not appear 
till after the above was written. 
23 On the rpdKhicAots Es • pov see an article in 
the Classical Review, Feb. 1893. 
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then decide the point of dispute which remained. In some cases however the 
law says that thlis shall be decided not by argument before a sworn judge 
but by the solemn oath of the accused. This is clearly quite distinct 
from the oath by which the witnesses confirm their statement; as the dis- 
tinction however has not been noticed I must justify it by referring to the 
various passages. 
Thle meaning of opKtI0c'epov is determined by the fact that, in three of 
the four places where it occurs, it is used of pairvpe : it is used to confirm 
their statement and that of the party. 
These passages are : 
Fr. B 3 etc.-rwirov '[ x'6y[]lovov OVOKvo, Tb O V vuvaTorV e't?&eOOat, A 
eY7parat at 8 6a TETvaK?7 ? t7 VU? b vv aTOV rL8tlE 0at, ,cahEv 
avrti ,atrTVpWV 8v•ov 
' 
VTatLv i~7rETe, at 8eLtKcet, O'icK', xK' OpItCOTEpov 
71A7v av'rov Kat TOV 1atLTvpav4 at crre8eTo i E'r',qXevae' 
Y ' 
.• 
6aXl 
If it dies or he is not able to pursue it, he shall call him before two 
witnesses within five days whether he will show it where it 
is, and he himself shall be on his oath and the witnesses, 
whether he pursued it or called him to show it. 
And in the passage quoted above (III.):- 
iii. 44.-al T'cKOtL 7V KepeLovaea 
e7rOeXevraL 7T ayv8pt 7rtl aordav civr 
patrTpave, al irjXevaav. 
In the case of a slave it is 
IKOcpIL6cEpoV, •1Ue• Vrv rreXevo-aa'ra 
ical 
r 
1zatTvpav,. 
It is quite clear that in both cases the oath here referred to is one 
which accompanies and confirms the plea and the witnesses who support it. 
Whether or not they were always put to the oath we cannot say; or, if the rule 
varied, what it was that fixed it for each case. It is not the oath of purgation 
which belongs to a subsequent stage; we may suppose that if one party stated 
his case with the evidence of the procedure witnesses, his opponent could 
require that he should be compelled to make the statements on oaths; if he 
did so they were proved, if not they fell to the ground, The oath however 
did not as a rule complete the case, it only confirmed the grounds on which 
it was begun; it took place at the same time as the pat'rvpia and was part 
of it. 
The other case is more difficult. The law is giving the fines to be paid 
in cases of rape: the last clauses of the chapter refer to rape on a slave-girl 
by her own master. 
ii. ll.--Evo•8LIav 4Xava al Idp'rEt 8a/1at-atro, 8mo aTar~jpave Kcara- 
varaoe, ai 86' Ka 8ep80/wa/EvaV ra 
e8' a/epav, 
•"hdeXv, 
a 8 c' iv 
VVKti c86' &/eXduv, opce tw 7pav 8' 6/1ev TaP 8C4Xav. 
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If he forcibly violates a slave-girl who belongs to the house, he shall 
pay two staters, if [he violates] by day one who has been (already) 
overpowered, one obol, but if it be at night, two obols, and the 
slave-girl shall be on her oath. 
In order to determine the meaning of this we must see in what this case 
differs from the others just preceding where there is no such provision. The 
preceding clauses relate to violence offered to a free man or woman, a woman 
who is in the charge of one who is not a citizen, or a slave (FotucKag-FoucE'av), 
presumably one belonging to some one else; the dvOo&t&la FOXa differs from 
the other cases in that she is completely in the power of her master. In all 
the other cases the suit would be brought by the guardian or husband of the 
freewoman, or by the master of the slave. This is shown clearly by a com- 
parison of iii. 45, etc., where the 7rdrvTas in the case of a slave takes the place 
of the 
,ca&eOral. The slave-girl then who is violated by her own master has 
naturally no one who can bring a suit or through whom she can obtain 
redress. To remedy this the law especially directs that she should be 
permitted to lay a charge against him herself, and support it by an oath. 
The accused would of course be allowed to clear himself by oath or in some 
other way. It is sufficiently extraordinary that at this early period a slave 
should be allowed to bring an action against her own master and apparently 
exact damages; the statement however is so clear that we must accept it. 
It is impossible to agree with Zittelmann in his explanation that the oath of 
the woman in this case, like an oath of purgation, decided the matter, and 
was followed by the condemnation: this affords no explanation of the 
fact that it applies only to the dvOostLla •Xa, and is unconnected 
with the other uses of the word 
dp•tio•repo9. 
As we shall see in all the 
undoubted cases where an oath absolutely ends the proceedings and is 
followed by judgment, the oath is taken by the accused, and the word 
awzro/.tdoat is used. 
The following instances are undoubted cases of the purgatory oath; 
in not one of them is the word opKtIrTepov used. 
iii. 6.-The matter in question is that an accusation is brought against 
a woman who is separated from her husband, of having taken away some 
property that belongs to him. If she acknowledges the charge, she is to pay 
a fine of five staters: it then continues. 
Cv Kc' EKCoavErQo-•r7at, 8t•cao'at 7~Ta yEvvatK' rooadat rta 'AprePLA 
rap' 'AlndcXatov rrap' '•Tv 'roco-tav. 'rt 8e' 715 K' 
a7rootoavo•a, rapeXp, reVTe 
aTraT•pav aTacrtaora~te 
tal 'b Kpco aTrWiv. 
With regard to that which she denies, he shall pass judgment that 
the women deny it on oath by Artemis near the Amyclaean near 
the Bow-woman. And whatever he takes away from her after she 
has denied it on oath he shall pay five staters and the value. 
H.S.---OL. XIII. F 
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Here we should have expected to find: whatever she denies, on that be 
shall decide on oath (tvVt•ura clpietv). The procedure in which the accused 
takes the oath is the substitute for the procedure by trial before a sworn 
judge. Judgment was given in this form: she shall deny it on oath, or 
pay. A later passage quoted above (V. xi. 46) gives further details with 
regard to the oath. It must be taken within twenty days, in the presence 
of the judge, and witnesses are to be present to read exactly the details of the 
charge of which she is to clear herself. 
ii. 36.-The next passage is equally clear. The case is: a man has 
caught an adulterer; according to the regular procedure he has warned the 
relatives. They, or the man himself, bring an action against the aggrieved 
husband accusing him of unlawful imprisonment (8oXCaa-aat). Again, 
instead of ordering that the judge shall take an oath and decide the matter, 
the law orders that the husband (who is now become the accused) shall clear 
himself by oath. 
al ne' a rcliovg cXuooeo at, hdoe-atl fv i6oheVra rc 7rrevrrwovrao-rar7jpo 
icat 7rXiovo '7Tre"Tov 
ai'ov, 
F\v ai'iv0 FFE'Kaoi-ov 67raptotevov, r& 8' 
acbeTa'apo 'Tprdm aV'r;V, 
'C7 
84 FotIKoq T w7raoiTav &'epOv av-ov 
•otxIo'V Xev, & Xwoo6T9at 8\ 
. 
But if he contends that he has enslaved him, let him swear who seized 
him, in the case of fifty staters and more with four others, each 
one calling curses on himself; in the case of one who is not a 
full citizen, with two others; in the case of a slave, the master 
with one other, that he took him in adultery and did not seize 
him as a slave. 
The peculiar interest of this passage 24 is that it is the only mention in 
Greek law of the ' eideshelfer' so common in German law. As a single 
instance which gives also the different number of oaths required for a free- 
man or a slave, we may quote Lex Rup. xvii.: Si quis hominem per noctem 
latenter incenderit, 600 solidos culpabilis judicetur, et insuper damno et dila- 
tura restituat. Aut si negaverit, cum 72 jurit. 
Si servus hoc fecerit, 36 solidos culpabilis judicetur, et insuper damno et 
dilatura restituat. Aut si negaverit, dominus ejus cum 6 jurit. 
ix. 54.-In this passage which was quoted above (VII.) we find that 
if a man tries to recover a debt and has no witnesses to prove it, then the 
defendant is allowed to clear himself by an oath. 
These are all the passages in the law where the word 
a'ropfarat 
is used; 
it is clear that in xi. 28 
'rd'4orov must refer to this procedure and not to the 
oaths which are referred to under the word 6pKtLCrepov. In all these cases 
the procedure by oath is a substitute for trial before a sworn judge. 
24 Compar. ad loc. 
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If the period of 1apTrvpiat is passed, if both pleas are established and 
there remains a point of fact to settle, then instead of deciding it on his oath 
the law in some cases orders the judge to pass judgment at once, the judgment 
taking the form that the defendant shall clear himself of the charge by oath, 
or pay the penalty required by the law. 
Here, as in deciding Karah 
'atr•pav1?, 
the magistrate is only carrying out 
the letter of the law; there is no occasion for him to use his own discretion. 
Hence he does not have to take an oath. The procedure by oath belongs to 
the department of the unsworn judge, just as at Athens the rrpdKXre9qo takes 
place before the ipx•ov 
not the 
8tKaotr5ptov, 
and in Rome an oath, if taken, is 
before the praetor not the judex."2 
The characteristic of the procedure in this stage is then that it is con- 
fined to that part of the trial in which there is no subject for decision to 
which the letter of the law cannot be applied mechanically. There is 
excluded from it all decisions on matters of right which the law does not 
decide, or the amount of a penalty which the law does not ordain, or a ques- 
tion of fact which is not decided by formal witnesses or by a purgatory 
oath of the defendant. These must be decided by the judge on 
his oath. 
The law gives us little information as to procedure before the judge 
when on his oath, just for the reason that this action of the judge began where 
the operation of the law ceased. 
As the law did not settle that point, he decided it absolutely according 
to his own opinions, with the single safeguard that he swore to do so honestly. 
This of course is just as was the case with the Athenian 
ctaoarTal. 
There 
is one expression in the law which though perhaps accidental is useful. In 
one passage instead of the formula Od'tvVVra KpivELV, it is said that the judge 
shall swear (3,guoat). The question is one of theft: the thief 'shall pay ten 
staters, and the thing double, whatever the judge swear that he has taken it' 
(T'rt I' &,0StKa-rT 6 Lee 
onvveo•o-dKo-at). (iii. 15.) 
Now we find that in 
English manorial law, if there was a dispute to be decided, it was decided by 
a court of twelve men on their oath; the decision or verdict is expressed 
in the form: the court say on their oath that so and so is the case; the 
answer to the plea is the sworn statement of the court, whether it be on a 
question of law or one of fact. What this court says, that is law or is fact; 
so we may conclude that at Gortyn if the matter came before a sworn judge, 
he was no longer bound by witnesses, but on his own knowledge prior to the 
case, or on any other source of information he could get by inquiry of any 
kind, he gives his decisions on the pleas (rrp0' a TtwohXtd'eva). The judgment 
is absolute, no reasons are given. 
I do not think then that there can be any doubt that the distinction of 
procedure from which we started is strictly analogous to that in jure and 
in judicio. If this is granted we have a most interesting illustration of the 
development of this distinction. It is I believe the only example that we 
25 Dig. xxxix. 3. 
2o 
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have of the maintenance of the distinction of procedure with unity of 
person. Here alone the actual trial is before the magistrate, who also 
receives and arranges the pleas and give orders for the execution of the law. 
At Rome and Athens in historical times the trial was not before the 
magistrate; we are however told that in both states the magistrates had 
originally tried the whole case. As Aristotle says,26 i tptot 8' o-av iKa Ta'i 
81ita aV'TOTEXet Kpi vetv Kai ov3X 
co'rep 
vv 7rpoavaicpivetv (ol pPXonVTE9). At Sparta civil27 cases were always tried by the Ephors alone. The discovery 
of this Cretan code justifies us in asserting that in early times this was the 
general if not the universal rule among the Latin and Hellenic races, at 
least for civil cases. 
A careful analysis of the cases however shows also that the 
.dis- tinction of procedure in this form in civil cases was comparatively modern, 
and was subsequent to the introduction of written laws. The law expressly 
requires the judge to decide without oath only in those cases where the 
written law is there to guide him. If, e.g., in an assault the fact is ever so 
clear, the judge cannot pass judgment without oath unless the law says what 
the penalty is to be; if there is no written law the punishment or fine 
must be assessed by some one speaking authoritatively instead of the law. 
If the law regulating succession to property was not written, in order to give 
a judgment some one must have solemnly stated what the law was. In 
Germany, as we know, this was provided for. In every tribe there were stated 
' Urtheil-finder ' who under different names and in different ways gave judgment 
on each case. When the laws were written a special clause was sometimes 
added that the law-giver should speak in accordance with the new code. 
Generally, if not always, the judgment had to receive the assent of the 
whole people; almost always the judgment-giver was different from the 
magistrate who presided and before whom the case was brought, and who 
executed the judgment. 
So far as our information goes, in Greece this duty of 'giving-dooms' 
was performed by the magistrate, the king was in this point the mouthpiece 
of the people; so it is in Homer and so we are told it was in Attica. When 
by the side of the king and archon thesmothets were introduced it seems 
as if they not only had to lay down the law, i.e. state the O8e/pol, but also 
as magistrates heard the suit from the beginning and executed the law. 
The magistrate who tried the case was himself the recorder of the law and 
customs of the city. There was no authoritative order which he was obliged 
to obey. There could not then be a distinction of procedure between that 
part of the trial where he acted as the administrator of a law delivered by 
others, and that in which he decided doubtful questions of fact or equity. 
The distinction of procedure then at Athens dates from the time of Draco; 
it was from his time specially enjoined that henceforth the magistrates should 
judge according to the laws: if they did not an appeal was allowed to the 
Council. Now the laws could not decide the whole of a case: they could not 
26 Ar. 'AO. nox. iii. 27 Ar. Pol, ii. 
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always say whether a fact had happened or not, nor did they, we may be sure, 
provide a penalty for every crime or foresee every disputed question of 
ownership. Points of equity then on which the laws did not provide a 
purely formal means of deciding, and points of fact which were not decided 
by the formal method of oath or ordeal, would as before be decided by the 
magistrates at their discretion speaking as 'Urtheil-finder'; in points where 
the law guided they would act as executive magistrates, carrying out the laws 
and strictly bound under penalty to obey them. From the time of Draco to 
the time of Solon Attic civil procedure must have been in the same stage as 
that which we find at Crete. The introduction of a large court of jurymen 
Solon borrowed from the criminal procedure and by so doing took away from 
the magistrates the last power of acting as judges that remained to them. 
The whole procedure in criminal matters was quite different; in them 
undoubtedly from the earliest times the judgment was given by the people or 
their representatives, the Council. Criminal matters are those in which an 
injury is done to the whole community. Murder especially was treated in 
this way; not only because the community was injured by the lawlessness, 
but because bloodshed involves religious impurity. I do not propose to enter 
into a discussion of criminal procedure here, it will be sufficient to point out 
that we have sufficient evidence that at Gortyn as elsewhere cases of this 
kind were decided in a popular court. When an adoption took place, it had 
to be proclaimed in the market-place before the whole body of citizens. 
It was a public act concerning all. Now if to be valid it had to take place 
in this manner it must at one time have required the express assent of the 
citizens, an assent which could have been refused. But if the assent was 
required to an act of this kind, it must have belonged to the same assembly 
of the people to determine whether any action was an injury to them, i.e. 
whether it was a crime, and if so what penalty was to be exacted. Here 
then the people themselves were the judgment-givers, not the magistrate. 
In the murder trial in Homer it is the rypovrev who give judgment: when 
the dvaYgel at Athens were tried, they were brought before a court of 300. 
In Draco's laws we have the earliest direct and clear reference to the 
distinction between the two parts of the procedure:"s :28 Cdaew ' 8 ob 
acreag a1WT^d VOV 7'? [E'dav T a'atzta-rat TrOv /ov]XeJ avTa. HAroWL 
e' (ra &taryveoat. J. W. HEADLAM. 
28 C..LZA. i. 61. 
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